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DELIVERING INDIGENTS' RIGHT TO
COUNSEL WHILE RESPECTING LAWYERS'
RIGHT TO THEIR PROFESSION: A SYSTEM
"BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE"
STAFFORD HENDERSON BYERS *
In this article, Professor Byers sets the stage for discussion by
juxtaposing indigents' right to counsel with lawyers' right to the
fruits of their labor. Following, Professor Byers asks a number
of probing questions: Is it mandatory that society apply an "ei-
ther or" approach to this matter? Is it possible to provide indi-
gents with effective assistance of counsel, while respecting law-
yers rights? Is a lawyer's right to the gains of her profession
constitutionally protected? Can any branch of government (judi-
cial, legislative, or executive), compel an attorney to represent
indigents, or anyone else for that matter, without compensation?
Whose responsibility is it (the private bar, individual attorneys,
or the government) to protect the constitutional rights of citi-
zens? In sum, Professor Byers concludes that it is the govern-
ment's responsibility to protect the constitutional rights of its
citizens. He then closes the article with thought provoking rec-
ommendations concerning the interaction between indigents'
right to counsel and lawyers' right to compensation for their la-
bor.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As the 21st century approaches, indigents' right to counsel, in
both criminal and civil matters, is in a state of flux as it relates
to the pro bono commitment of lawyers. This state of flux is no-
where more evident than in judicial decisions. As a result, there
has been a spirited discussion regarding this topic. 1 One ap-
proach to this problem analyzes it from a professional responsi-
bility perspective. According to this approach, lawyers are ex-
pected to render unpaid legal services to indigents and
subsequently, to make an annual report to the appropriate
regulatory authority notifying it of the lawyer's fulfillment of his
duty.2 Another approach focuses on the monopolistic character of
the legal profession as it relates to the delivery of legal services
to indigents. Because of this monopoly, it is urged that the pro-
fession take reasonable steps to alleviate the problem. Invaria-
bly, the only remedy is mandatory pro bono services. 3
Another school of thought is the officer-of-the-court notion.
This view advocates mandatory pro bono service to indigents as
an inherent duty of each lawyer as an officer of the court and as
an implied condition for the license to practice law. 4 Moreover,
under this view, only mandatory pro bono service to indigents
will meet the exigencies of the desperate legal needs of the "dis-
advantaged" and "disempowered."5
1 See, e.g., Arthur Gilbert & William Gorenfeld, The Constitution Should Protect Eve-
ryone - Even Lawyers, 12 PEPP. L. REV. 75, 84-86 (1984) (indicating that Constitution
was intended to protect lawyers against such atrocities as compelled representation of
clients without compensation); Frank I Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1165, 1171 (1967) (characterizing issue in terms of fairness, burden to one and benefit to
another); Joseph L. Sax, Taking, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149,
150-51 (1971) (outlining problem of determining when "taking" occurs constitutionally);
Joseph L. Sax, Taking and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 36 (1964) (discussing zon-
ing and other regulations exercised by the state).
2 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 6.1 (1993).
3 See Barlow F. Christensen, The Lawyer's Pro bono Publico Responsibility, 1981 AM.
B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 1.
4 See Debra Burke et al., Mandatory Pro bono! Cui Bono?, 25 STETSON L. REV. 983,
987 (1996) (addressing monopoly argument against attorneys); Steven B. Rosenfeld,
Mandatory Pro bono: Historical and Constitutional Perspectives, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 255,
255 (1981) (discussing Association of the Bar of the City of New York Proposal as well as
RPC Discussion Draft Proposal).
5 See Dean S. Spencer, Mandatory Public Service for Attorneys: A Proposal for the
Future, 12 Sw. U. L. REV. 493, 519 (1981) (stating that legal profession which holds "a
monopoly on access to the keys of legal power... has a special ethical concern for allevi-
ating this inequity").
BETWEEN A ROCKAND A HARD PLACE
Opponents of mandatory pro bono legal service argue that
mandatory service violates many constitutional rights, among
them the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition of involuntary ser-
vitude,6 the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
(which incorporates the "Takings" Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment),7 as well as the Equal Protection Clause.8 Another argu-
ment, although used less frequently, posits that mandatory pro
bono service interferes with the right of association implicit in
the First Amendment. 9
Interestingly enough, Canon 2 of the ABA Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility only places an ethical duty to represent
the poor.10 However, the Sixth Amendment right to effective as-
sistance of counsel creates an enormous burden on the legal pro-
fession.11 By one estimate, 30% to 70% of those charged with
6 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. This section provides in full: "Neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction." Id.
7 See U.S. CONST. amend. V. In relevant part, this amendment reads: "nor shall pri-
vate property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Id. See generally,
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (stating that due process clause
guarantees'that property will not be taken for public use without due process); Schware
v. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 353 U.S. 232, 238 (1957) (indicating that state cannot exclude per-
son from practice of law without due process).
8 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. In relevant part, this section reads: "nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of laws." Id.; see also David L.
Schapiro, The Enigma of a Lawyer's Duty to Serue, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 735, 762 (1980)
(addressing Fourteenth Amendment ramifications of mandatory pro bono work).
9 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridg-
ing the freedom of speech, or of the press; or of the right of the people peaceably to as-
semble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.; see also Shapiro,
supra note 8, at 735, 766 & n.153 (discussing free-conscious argument concerning pro
bono work).
10 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-25 (1991). This section
coincides with ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT, RULE 6.1, which reads "A
lawyer should aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per
year. In fulfilling this responsibility, the lawyer should: (a) provide a substantial major-
ity of the (50) hours of legal services without fee or expectation of fee to: (1) persons of
limited means ... " Id.
11 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In pertinent part, this amendment reads "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ... have the Assistance of Counsel for his de-
fense." Id.; see also ROBERT H. ARONSON & DONALD T. WECKSTEIN, PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 119 (1980). This great need has developed for several reasons. First,
there are many indigents caught up in the criminal justice system. Second, these indi-
gents do not possess the resources to procure proper legal representation. Third, they
have a constitutional right to legal representation. Finally, there is a serious lack of
funding for legal services to indigents. Moreover, by and large, public sentiment has
changed towards indigents, in that a significant segment of the general public seems
disinclined to underwrite more services to the poor with tax dollars. The 1996 Welfare
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felonies are indigents and cannot afford a lawyer. 12 Programs
such as Legal Aid, Public Defender, Judicare, group and prepaid
legal services, and legal clinics 13 have been established to effec-
tuate indigents' right to counsel. Although these programs have
provided effective legal services to indigents, the fact remains
that these programs are far from sufficient. 14
In light of the shortcomings of such programs, coupled with
cutbacks in both federal and state funding, especially since
1981,15 the private bar has been pressured to take a more active
role in representing indigents. Moreover, courts have intimated
that the services of an attorney may be constitutionally required
for the indigent civil litigant. 16 For example, courts have re-
quired attorneys to represent indigents in child custody cases,17
and in civil cases where the privilege against self-incrimination
is or may be invoked. 18
Lawyers providing legal services to indigents in both criminal
and civil cases have had to do so for little or no compensation. 19
In light of the enormity of this problem, the legal profession, and
Reform Bill, PL 104-193, 1996, HR 3734, which cuts programs to indigents and the Fed-
eral Legal Services Corporation Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. 2996, which cuts funding to legal
services to indigents, illustrate this point clearly. This scenario places a tremendous
burden on the private bar to provide pro bono services to indigents.
12 See YALE KAMISAR & WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, n.
G 7 1(6th Ed. 1986) (describing estimates concerning indigents in legal system).
13 See Aronson, supra note 11, at 148-153 (discussing various organizations enrolled
in extending legal services to indigents).
14 See id.
15 Since 1981, the pendulum of public sentiment has swung against helping the poor
and indigents. Funding has been cut and the poor are left mostly on their own. This new
apathy toward the poor reached its peak in the 1996 with the enactment of several pieces
of legislation. See, e.g., 1996 Welfare Bill, Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, PL 104-193,1996, H.R. 3734; 1996 Immigration Bill, 8
U.S.C.A. 1601; 1997 Budget Reconciliation Bill, 7 Years Balanced Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1997, H-R. Rep. 104-292; Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2996; see also
Washington Journal (C-Span television broadcast, December 5, 1997). Boston Univer-
sity's Professor of Economics, Dr. Glen Loury stated that despite public sentiment
against funding programs for the poor, the social problems created by arbitrarily cutting
off people from the welfare rolls may haunt America for years to come.
16 See, e.g., Alan J. Stein, Note, The Indigent's "Right" to Counsel in Civil Cases, 43
FORDHAM L. REV. 989, 995 (1975) (indicating cases which have required attorney repre-
sentation of indigent parties in civil matters).
17 See Danforth v. State Dep't of Health and Welfare, 303 A.2d 794, 800 (Me. 1973)
(holding that due process requires appointment of counsel to indigent parents in child
custody cases).
18 See, e.g., Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 461 (1975) (holding that counsel is nec-
essary for privilege against self-incrimination to exist).
19 See, e.g., , ARONSON & WECKSTEIN supra note 11, at 121, 152-53 (discussing dis-
proportionality between pro bono fees and fair market value of these services); see also
Shapiro, supra note 8, at 777-84 (discussing low fees in pro bono work by attorneys).
BETWEEN A ROCKAND A HARD PLACE
indeed the entire justice system, must address several questions
including, but not limited to: Can a judge compel a lawyer to de-
fend an indigent client without compensation? Can a legislature
require mandatory pro bono service from lawyers as a condition
for the retention of their license to practice law?20 In other
words, since access to courts is a constitutionally protected right
based on the Sixth Amendment, who has the obligation to pro-
tect this right? Who should bear the cost? Should this protec-
tion and cost be thrust upon one small segment of society (law-
yers) or should it be borne by society at large? Moreover, can a
policy that abridges one group's constitutional rights (lawyers
right against takings) to protect the constitutional rights of an-
other group (indigents access to courts) ever be justified? The ul-
timate question is not whether mandatory pro bono service is de-
sirable, but rather, whether it is constitutional.
This article examines the aforementioned issues and responds
to them. Section II traces the historical development of the
"right to counsel," while Section III discusses the issues at stake.
Pursuant to these two sections, the article will discuss in argu-
ments for and against compulsory pro bono service, and constitu-
tional concerns at both the state and Federal levels. Section IV
presents a number of recommendations. For practical purposes,
the involuntary servitude argument of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment,2 1 the First Amendment issue and the Equal Protection ar-
gument will not be discussed.22
20 In 1976, Assemblyman Knox of California introduced a bill (A-B. No. 4050) which
required attorneys to render forty hours pro bono work per year as a condition to retain
their license to practice law. Although the bill failed, it demonstrated a strong sentiment
held by many.
21 See Rosenfeld, supra note 4, at 290-94 (providing good discussion of related analo-
gies between mandatory pro bono work and involuntary servitude); see also Robert S.
Hunter, Slave Labor in the Courts - A Suggested Solution, 74 CASE & COM., No. 4, 3
(1969) (discussing severity of hardship that court appointments have on attorneys where
no provision for compensation exists).
22 Often the Equal Protection argument is made as a de facto or quasi Due Process
argument. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 8, at 770-777. I conclude that the Equal Protec-
tion argument is a de facto or quasi due process argument because its proponents usually
argue, not for other professional groups to be treated like lawyers, but for lawyers to be
treated like other professional groups; Hunter, supra note 21, at 10. After stating that
mandatory representation of indigents without compensation deprives attorneys of their
"equal protection," the author concludes: "No court would consider ordering a grocer to
give a shelf full of groceries to a poor person just because the state had given him the
right to operate his business. Similarly, it is inconceivable that a doctor would be ordered
by a court to give his services to the indigent. The plain fact is that it is not necessary for
anyone other than lawyers to give their goods or services just because the court so or-
ders." Id.
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II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A. Development and Application of the Sixth Amendment
The Sixth Amendment provides in relevant part that "in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to
have assistance of counsel."23 In colonial times, defendants in
North America were granted the right to be represented by re-
tained counsel. 24 Between 1791 and 1932, state and federal
courts heard virtually no cases on the right to counsel.25 How-
ever, in 1932, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of the
right to counsel for indigents in the landmark case of Powell v.
Alabama.26 In Powell, the Court held that indigent defendants
have a right to appointed counsel in capital crimes. 27 Six years
later, in 1938, the court extended this right to indigent defen-
dants in felony federal trials.28 In 1942, however, the Supreme
Court refused to extend this right to indigent criminal defen-
dants in state trials.29 It was not until 1963, 21 years later, that
this right was finally held applicable to the states.30
23 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(holding right to counsel in federal court is fundamental right).
24 See RONALD J. ALLEN & RICHARD B. KUHNS, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 120 (1985) (discussing right to counsel with some historical perspectives);
Roscoe Pound, The Future of Criminal Law, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 13, 16 (1921) (stating
that in certain periods during 1920's, callousness towards defendants developed); see also
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 65 (1932) (stating that right to counsel in felony case
was part of early common law).
25 See Note, An Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel During Police Interro-
gations, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1031 (1964) (indicating that most states lacked rules for right
to counsel). But see, e.g., Andersen v. Treat, 172 U.S. 24 (1898) (approving appointment
of counsel by lower court); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 386 (1898) (noting American
superiority over English with respect to one's right to counsel).
26 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (holding assistance of counsel is required in capital of-
fenses).
27 See id. at 71; see also ALLEN & Kuhns supra note 24, at 120 (discussing how Pow-
ell v. Alabama created special circumstances rule, which evolved into requirement of
counsel in capital cases by 1961 in Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961)); Pound, su-
pra note 24, at 13-16 (stating that national attention given Scotsboro cases prompted Su-
preme Court to hear Powell v. Alabama).
28 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938) (indicating Sixth Amendment re-
quires counsel to be provided to indigents).
29 See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461-72 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that states are not required to provide counsel for
indigent defendants).
30 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963). The court heard about
thirty cases in these twenty-one intervening years, and except for a few, found compel-
ling reasons to entitle defendants to counsel. Id. Gideon made universal what was al-
ready all but universal. Id.
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B. Development of the Concept of Effective Assistance of Counsel
According to the Supreme Court, the Sixth Amendment does
not merely entitle the defendant to counsel, it entitles him to the
effective assistance of counsel. 3 1 This, however, is a judicial stan-
dard; the Constitution only requires assistance of counsel.32 The
Court reasoned that the word "effective" was needed to give
teeth to this Amendment. This interpretation has been justified
by the contention that the effectiveness of counsel is demanded
or else the defendant would be helpless against the powers of the
state.33 Therefore, effectiveness of counsel serves to counterbal-
ance the unfairness existing between the state and the individ-
ual.34 The stringent standard also ensures that defendants, es-
pecially indigent ones, are not left to the mercy of incompetent
counsel. 35
Consequently, even a defendant who has been represented by
counsel may nevertheless be able to show that his Sixth
Amendment right has been violated. In such a case, the defen-
dant is required to show (1) that the counsel's performance was
deficient in the sense that counsel was not a reasonably compe-
tent attorney; (2) that the deficiencies in counsel's performance
were prejudicial to the defense; and (3) but for the counsel's un-
professional errors, there was a reasonable probability that the
result of the proceedings would have been different.36
31 See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-87 (1984) (indicating that
Sixth Amendment requires effective assistance of counsel, not just right to counsel).
32 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In full, the amendment reads:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witness
against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
Id.
33 See generally Pound, supra note 24, at 15 (discussing that accused need attorneys).
34 See generally Note, supra note 25, at 1030 (indicating that Forefathers intended
that accused have right to counsel).
35 See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (stating that "defendants
cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel").
36 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-96 (holding that requirements must be met to have
reversible error).
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III. THE ISSUES AT STAKE
A. Mandatory Pro Bono Service, Funding and the Courts
The issue of compelled representation first arose in the context
of suits brought by lawyers against county governments to collect
fees that were awarded them by trial courts.37 The majority of
early cases "held that an attorney could not maintain an action
against a county unless there was an express statutory authori-
zation for funding. ' 38 The courts in these cases were more con-
cerned with the liability of governmental bodies than with the
well-being of the attorney.39 A recurring issue during this period
was the liability of a county for various services rendered to the
poor. 40 In addressing this issue, courts have used three basic ar-
guments, set forth below, to justify compulsory pro bono service:
(1) the monopoly argument, 41 (2) the officer of the court argu-
ment, 42 and (3) the professional obligation argument
B. Arguments in Support of Mandatory Pro Bono Service
The monopoly argument suggests that compulsory pro bono
service is justified since lawyers enjoy a monopoly in the delivery
of legal services.43 The nature of the services that lawyers pro-
37 See, e.g., State v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757, 760 (Mo. 1985) (describing history of
compensation in cases where court appoints counsel).
38 See id. at 760 & n. 4 (discussing history of lawsuits against states by attorneys).
39 See id. at 761 & n. 5 (discussing liability of counties when it came to issue of indi-
gents).
40 See, e.g., Cantrell v. Clark County, 1 S.W. 200, 201 (Ark. 1886) (indicating sur-
geon's care of pauper cannot later be charged to the County); Manfield v. Sac County, 14
N.W. 73 ( Iowa 1882) (stating that County not liable for medical services to pauper when
doctor did not comply with statutory requirements of trustee approval).
41 See Roper, 688 S.W.2d at 764 (illustrating theory that "the practice of law is a mo-
nopoly because it is limited to a select few and because that limitation results in re-
straints upon the public's use of legal services"); see also Jewell v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d
536 (W.Va. 1989) (recognizing monopoly that lawyer's have as it relates to pro bono
work).
42 See U.S. v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965) (holding that counsel are offi-
cers of the court and compelled service does not amount to taking without just compensa-
tion); see also In re Amendments to Rules Regulating the Florida Bar-1.3.1(a) and Rules
of Judicial Administration, 598 So.2d 412, 412 (Fl. 1992) (holding that pro bono is part of
lawyer's public responsibility as officer of court); Jackson v. State, 413 P.2d 488, 490
(Alaska 1966) (using officer of court theory in requiring pro bono work).
43 See Lester Brickman, Of Arterial Passageways Through the Legal Process: The
Right of Universal Access to Courts and Lawyering Services, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 595, 626
(1973) (stating that there were "implicit limitations" on monopoly power of lawyers which
may provide "a right of access to legal services.").
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vide creates the monopoly, because the market for legal services
is limited to lawyers who are certified by the state. Because this
monopoly is granted by the state, this argument theorizes that
the bar should be regarded as a public utility, and therefore
regulated for the public interest. 44
The officer-of-the-court doctrine was developed in English
common law because some lawyers employed by the court were
granted special privileges. This doctrine has raised its head in
some American cases. In utilizing this doctrine, the Ninth Cir-
cuit has held that the obligation to serve as appointed counsel
without compensation is an ancient and established tradition, a
condition arising out of the licensing of lawyers as officers of the
court. 45 The court further added that an attorney is aware of this
obligation and consents to it by entering the profession. There-
fore, under this doctrine, an attorney cannot assert that pro bono
service is an unjust taking of his services or property.46
Lastly, courts have also relied on the notion that lawyers have a
professional obligation to provide gratuitous services upon a court
order.47 According to one court, "the high purpose and traditions of
the legal profession require that this burden be shouldered by its
members."48 Another court suggested that the profession of law
rests upon its commitment to public service which requires its
members to engage in pro bono activities. 49
C. Arguments Against Mandatory Pro Bono Service
Opponents of mandatory pro bono service argue that although
entry requirements to practice law result in the enrichment of
44 See id. at 626-27. Professor Brickman argues that the legal profession should be
treated like public utilities and regulated as such. Id. This would give the state the right
to demand free legal sources from lawyers for indigents. Id. Professor Brickman's article
was written over 23 years ago, and although his position has changed very little over
those years, it would be interesting to know how he feels about this issue today. For in-
stance, since utility companies all over the country are being deregulated, should the le-
gal profession also be deregulated and unshackled from mandatory pro bono service?
45 See Dillon, 346 F.2d at 633 (discussing and applying officer of court doctrine).
46 See id. at 635 (holding that counsel did not have to be compensated for court com-
pelled representation because of awareness when entering profession of traditions of rep-
resenting indigents for little or no compensation).
47 See Roper, 688 S.W.2d at 763 (presenting notion that lawyers have duty to practice
gratuitous service to indigents).
48 State v. Clifton, 172 So.2d 657, 667 (La. 1965).
49 See In re Synder, 734 F.2d 334, 338-39 (8th Cir. 1984) (stating that it has been
consistently recognized attorneys have duty to serve willingly as officer of court).
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some lawyers, many others have not benefited from the windfall.
Moreover, standards and entry requirements to practice law are
erected for the protection of the public, not the enrichment of at-
torneys. 50 Any resulting enrichment is at best incidental. 51
Furthermore, it is argued that the monopoly theory in favor of
pro bono services is incorrect because there is no monopoly in
fact.52 A monopoly is present only if a few lawyers are present in
the market place. These lawyers would then be able to control the
sale of legal services and the prices charged for these services.
This is a situation that does not exist.53 Additionally, in further
50 See In re Conner, 207 S.W.2d 492, 499 (Mo. 1948). The court stated that "the
privilege to practice law, quite unlike the right of a citizen to engage in ordinary trade of
business, carries no inherent right to continue in the practice." Id.; see also THOMAS
MORGAN & RONALD ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS
1-26 (6th ed. 1995). The authors state that in order to protect the public from illiterate
and otherwise incompetent attorneys, several steps were taken by the respective states
as well as the American Bar Association. Id. First, apprenticeship periods were length-
ened and enforced. Second, several bars raised their admission requirements. Id. Third,
law school attendance and graduation were made mandatory before one could qualify to
take the bar. Id. Finally, accreditation standards for law schools became so burdensome
that many schools had to close their doors. Id.
51 See MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 50, at 3 n. 3 (relying on Blodgett, Time and
Money: A Look at Today's Lawyer, ABA JOURNAL, Sept. 1, 1986, at 47 and LISSY,
AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION COMPENSATION AND BENEFIT REVIEW 10 (May
1994)). The median income of lawyers was lower-$64,448 in 1986. Id. According to the
ABA survey, about 45% of American lawyers in 1986 earned between $35,000 and 75,000
per year. Id. Another 35% earned between $75,000 and $250,000 annually. Id. About
16% earned less than $35,000 per year, and about 4% earned over $250,000. Id. Lawyer
salaries, on average, have remained constant or even fallen in recent years. Id.
52 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1007 (6th ed. 1990). Monopoly is defined as:
A privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or more persons or companies, con-
sisting in the exclusive right (or power) to carry on a particular business or trade,
manufacture a particular article, or control the sale of the whole supply of a par-
ticular commodity. A form of market structure in which one or only a few firms
dominate the total sales of a product or service.
Id.; see also United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). In this case,
"monopoly" as prohibited by Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, has two elements:
possession of monopoly power in relevant market and willful acquisition or maintenance
of that power, as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a supe-
rior product, business acumen, or historic accident. Id.; United States v. Otter Tail Power
Co., 331 F.Supp. 54, 58 (D.C. .Minn. 1971). A monopoly condemned by the Sherman Act
is the power to fix prices or exclude competition, coupled with policies designed to use or
preserve that power. Id.; Davidson v. Kansas City Star Co., 202 F.Supp. 613, 617 ( D.C.
Mo. 1962). It is "monopolization" in violation of Sherman Antitrust Act for persons to
combine or conspire to acquire or maintain power to exclude competitors from any part of
trade or commerce, provided they also have such power that they are able, as a group, to
exclude actual or potential competition and provided that they have intent and purpose
to exercise that power. Id.
53 See MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 50, at 2-3 & n.2. The authors note that as of
1995, there were about 875,000 practicing lawyers in the United States, 2 1/2 times the
number for 1970. Id. Roughly 40,000 are added to the bar each year while roughly
15,000 leave annually. Id. If the present trend continues by the year 2000, there will be
over 1,000,000 practicing lawyers in the United States. Id.; Dereck Bok, A Flawed Sys-
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contravention of the monopoly argument, non-lawyers can freely
represent themselves in court even in serious cases. 54
If the monopoly argument is effective against lawyers, the result
would be to require all other professional groups subject to licens-
ing to render gratuitous services to indigent members of society. 55
The fact is only physicians can practice medicine, and only den-
tists can practice dentistry. Such professionals have and enjoy a
monopoly. Applying the rationale that lawyers should be required
tern: Report to the Harvard Board of Overseers, 85 HARVARD MAG. 38, 41 (1983). The
President of Harvard University states: "The net result of this trend is a massive diver-
sion of exceptional talent into pursuits that add little to the growth of the economy, the
pursuit of culture, or the enhancement of the human spirit." Id.; see also Jane Burn-
baum, "Guilty! Too Many Lawyers and Too Much Litigation: Here's a Better Way," BUS.
WK., April 13, 1992, at 60- 61. To make her case, the author mentions that there are
307.4 lawyers per 100,000 persons in the U.S., while there are only 100.7 lawyers per
100,000 persons in Britain; 83 lawyers per 100,000 persons in Germany; and 12.1 law-
yers per 100,000 persons in Japan. Id. But see James 0. Castagnera, Why the Nation
Needs More Lawyers, 22 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 19, 25-27 (1996-97) The author argues that
there is actually a shortage of lawyers in the United States. Id. In contradistinction to
Bok, Castegnera avers that because of the training and experience of lawyers they are fit
for varied professions in society. Id. If lawyers were utilized on a greater scale in other
professions, their analytical and professional skills would add significantly to productiv-
ity thereby improving the economy. Id. Additionally, Castagnera makes the very impor-
tant point that Burnbaum's articles quotes statistics but does not take into account the
differences in the other societies and the United States. Bok's, assumption entails a
number of logical leaps, while the Burnbaum's article is very strong on presenting em-
pirical data, but very weak on analysis. For example, Bok diminishes, or totally disre-
gards the very important role played by attorneys in all facets of contemporary life. Con-
trary to Bok's assertion, lawyers add much to the growth of the economy by fighting to
enforce laws that encourage competition, commercial transactions, as well as individual
liberty. Furthermore, lawyers add significantly to the development, expression and pres-
ervation of culture, by among other things, fighting to enforce intellectual property laws
as well as the first amendment. Burnbaum, on the other hand, takes empirical data and
attempts to apply it without any contextualization. In the process, she ignores the dif-
ferences; cultural, constitutional, etc., which exist between the United States and the
other countries mentioned in her article. For example, none of the other countries has a
constitution like United States, nor do any of them emphasize individual rights as we
do. Moreover, since 1992, the year in which Burnbaum wrote her article, the economy of
the United States has out performed and out produced all other economies, including
Germany and Japan; yet there are more lawyers in America today than in 1992. Id.; See
generally, ALEXIS DE TOCQUEViLLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, Vol. 1. 98-105 (Richard D.
Heffner ed., 1960) (Orig. Pub. 1945). The author states that American Judges possess
unique powers, unparalleled by judges in other countries. Id. Americans have Constitu-
tional and Political Rights unparalleled by citizens in other countries. Id. Even political
issues become rights upon which judges must rule. Id.
54 See World News Tonight, (ABC television broadcast, Dec. 12, 1997). For example,
the State of Arizona has established "Quick Court," which allows people to represent
themselves, even in serious matters such as divorces. Id.; see also Andrew Blum, LIRR
Gunman Goes Pro Se With Perplexing Voir Dire - Strange Behavior Follows a Rejected
Insanity Defense, NA'L L. J., Feb. 6, 1995, at All. The case of Colin Ferguson, is an ex-
treme, but clear example of non-lawyers representing themselves. Id.
55 See Sparks v. Parker, 368 So.2d 528, 535 (Ala. 1979) (Maddox, J., dissenting). If
this is a condition of a lawyer's license to practice law, then other professions subject to
licensing should similarly be required to offer free service to indigents as a condition of
retaining their license. Id.
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to represent indigents, doctors and dentists, therefore, should be
required to treat indigent patients without receiving a fee. Al-
though access to courts is a constitutionally protected right,56
while access to medical care is not,57 such a distinction is immate-
rial. The questions that need to be asked are: Why shouldn't medi-
cal care be a constitutionally protected right? Does it make sense
to say that a person has a right to legal counsel for fear of the loss
of his freedom (imprisonment), but no right to medical care for
fear of the loss of his life (death)? Although a constitutional ar-
gument can be made for medical care, this article, for practical
purposes, will not address the merits of this issue.
Historically, the officer of the court doctrine is even more vul-
nerable to attacks than the monopoly argument. As early as 1794,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recognized that American at-
torneys during the colonial period did not enjoy the privileges and
exemptions of their English counterparts. 58 In 1810, for similar
reasons, the Virginia Supreme Court questioned the appropriate-
ness of applying this doctrine in America. 59 Moreover, in 1854,
the Indiana Supreme Court held that an attorney had no obliga-
tion to serve gratuitously, since the idea of an attorney having
special privileges was obsolete. 60 The court further reasoned that
the attorney's profession was his livelihood, and compared his
services and compensation to that of other professionals. 61
Courts today are no less scathing in their attack on this doc-
trine. The Missouri Supreme Court, for instance, has stated that
the time has come to abandon the invocation of this doctrine, and
to lay to rest this anachronism from English history. The ration-
ale for such an attack is that the role of the English lawyer has no
counterpart in America. Moreover, in distinguishing the Ninth
Circuit case which applied the doctrine, 62 the court reasoned that
56 See Brickman, supra note 43, at 595 (describing right to access to courts).
57 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 298 (1980) (holding freedom of choice of indi-
gent woman to terminate her pregnancy does not entitle her to financial resources under
Hyde Amendment).
58 See Republica v. Fisher, 1 Yeates 349, 350 (Pa. 1794) (stating that in England, at-
torney cannot be compelled to serve in militia or be arrested by original process).
59 See Leigh's Case, 15 Va. 1 Mumf. 468, 486 (1810) (stating that person admitted to
bar was not "office, civil or military, under the Commonwealth").
60 See Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 14 (1854) (indicating that attorneys have no special
privileges in their favor).
61 See id.
62 See U.S. v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 638 (9th Cir. 1965) (holding that attorney called
by courts to represent indigents for less than his fee cannot bring claim).
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the Ninth Circuit misunderstood English practice and focused its
reasoning on the power of the English courts to appoint sergeants-
at-law. These sergeants-at-law were actually public officials who
shared no common role with contemporary American attorneys. 63
Courts giving credence to the professional obligation doctrine of-
ten rely on the Code of Professional Responsibility for their sup-
port.64 This is based on a loose, and arguably irresponsible, inter-
pretation of both Canon 2 of the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 6.1 of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.65 Furthermore, the development of the doctrine and the
analysis posited by its proponents are fuzzy and unconvincing. 66
At best, the provisions of the present code, though desirable, are
voluntary, hortatory, aspirational, and are not intended to be
mandatory.67 Moreover, a proposed mandatory requirement was
rejected by at least one court. 68 The Kutak Commission, estab-
lished by the ABA to deal with lawyers professional responsibili-
ties, first recommended at least forty hours of service, "Pro bono
publico," per year by each lawyer.69 After much discussion, the
Commission modified its proposal. 70 By late 1980, the Commission
63 See State v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757, 767 (Mo. 1985) (abandoning doctrine that law-
yers are officers of court); see also Warner v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.2d 209, 211-12
(Ky. 1966) (stating that it was appropriate to question whether traditional officer of court
doctrine had become unfair to bar, though ultimately did not adopt doctrine).
64 See Bradshaw v. Dist. Court, 742 F.2d 515, 518 (9th Cir. 1984) (relying on Model
Code of Professional Responsibility); In re Smiley, 330 N.E.2d 53, 56 (N.Y. 1975) (stating
that obligation is expressed in Code of Professional Responsibility); Ex Parte Dibble,- 310
S.E.2d. 440 (S.C. 1983) (indicating reliance on state ethical considerations that provide
attorneys obligation to render free legal services).
65 See Swygert, Should Indigent Civil Litigants in Federal Courts Have a Right to
Appointed Counsel?, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1267, 1297 (1982) (interpreting Model Code
of Professional Responsibility).
66 See Christensen, supra note 3, at 1 (stating doctrine of professional obligation is
unclear).
67 See Swygert, supra note 65, at 1267. The author indicates that the Code provisions
were not meant to be mandatory. Id.; see also Shapiro, supra note 8, at 787-88. The
Ethical Considerations are "aspirational in character," while the Disciplinary Rules are
"mandatory in character," i.e. discipline may be imposed for a violation. Id. Lawyers duty
to serve in pro bono capacity, falls within the "Ethical considerations" not the "Discipli-
nary Rules." Id.
68 See State v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757, 767 (Mo. 1985) (rejecting proposed mandatory
provision and stating current Model Code only expressed policy favoring pro bono repre-
sentation).
69 See, e.g., Memorandum from Donald J. Evans to Committee on Counsel Responsi-
bility and Liability (Aug. 20, 1979). This recommendation appeared as Rule 9.1 in a draft
prepared by the Commission in 1979 and was given limited circulation. Id.
70 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 8.1 (Discussion Draft 1980).
The text of the proposal provides:
A lawyer shall render unpaid public interest legal service. A lawyer may discharge
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returned to the policy taken in the 1979 Code, 71 which only ex-
pressed a policy favoring and encouraging pro bono representa-
tion, not mandating it.72 After a series of very contentious debates,
the mandatory and onerous provisions were stricken before they
could become effective.
D. The Civil, Criminal Distinction
Sometimes, there has been made a distinction between pro bono
service in civil and criminal cases.73 According to the Missouri Su-
preme Court, there is little evidence that uncompensated ap-
pointments either were or should have been compelled in civil
cases. 74 Moreover, the court held that the appointment of counsel
is less compelling in civil cases than in criminal ones, because of
the possibility that the defendant in a criminal case could be in-
carcerated. 75 Hence, the court stated that the indigent civil liti-
this responsibility by service in activities for improving the law, the legal system,
or the legal profession, or by providing professional services to persons of limited
means or to such service to appropriate regulatory authority.
Id. The draft also provided:
A lawyer shall not decline appointment by a court or other authority to represent a
person except for the following reasons or other good cause: Representing the cli-
ent would be likely to result in a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Representing the client would result in an unreasonable financial burden on the
lawyer; or; the client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to impair the
lawyer's ability to represent the client.
Id.; see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-26 to 2-30 (1980).
71 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (working Draft 1980). The full
text of this revision was: "A lawyer should render unpaid public interest legal service. A
lawyer may discharge this responsibility by providing professional services to persons of
limited means or to improving the law, the legal system, or the legal profession." Id.
72 See Pro bono Legal Service: An Executive Committee Position, 36 Record of N.Y.C.
B.A. 9 (1981). A lawyer shall participate in providing public interest legal services. A
lawyer may discharge this obligation by activities on behalf of the public for improving
the law, the legal system or the legal profession, by providing legal services to persons
unable to afford adequate legal representation or to public service groups or organiza-
tions or by financial support for such activities or legal services. Id. The Executive Com-
mittee emphasized its opinion that both the present ABA code and its own proposal set
forth an "ethical mandate" owed by each lawyer to the public. Id. at 10-11. At the same
time, it urged that the mandate should be "enforced through self-evaluation and not dis-
ciplinary sanctions." Id. at 11. Finally, it was stressed that, in its view, the obligations
could be satisfied in whole or in part by a financial contribution, id. at 11, but that public
interest services rendered for compensation could properly be taken into account. Id. at
12.
73 See In re Smiley, 330 N.E.2d 53, 55 (N.Y. 1975) (discussing that direction to pro-
vide counsel to defendants in criminal cases comes from federal and state constitutions
while there is no similar constitutional provision applicable to private litigation).
74 See State v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757, 759-60 (Mo. 1985) (discussing "parcity of case
law and concerning appointments in civil cases" and lack of history for appointments in
civil actions).
75 See id. at 767.
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gant could find recourse in hiring a lawyer on a contingent fee ba-
sis, 7 6 or through legal organizations serving indigents. 77
The majority opinion in this case elicited a rather blistering at-
tack from the dissent. First, the dissent chided the majority for
taking the position that indigent civil litigants can find recourse
from legal service organizations and volunteer lawyers in light of
cutbacks in funding and their present overwhelming case load.78
The dissent was similarly critical of the "free market" "contingent
fee" suggestion of the majority. This suggestion was attributed
this to "Posner's Darwinistic Analysis," which only assists a few
selected civil litigants who have a strong possibility of recovering
monetary award.79
The dissent argued for a more consistent approach in assisting
indigent civil litigants. In essence, an indigent person who wants
to make a claim should have access to a lawyer responsible for
personal and professional advice.8 0 Furthermore, it was argued
that if uncompensated appointment of counsel can be justified in
criminal cases, similar justification can be found in some civil
cases.8 1 For instance, concern for the administration of justice
should be just as great in civil cases as it is in criminal cases.82
Moreover, the concerns of possible incarceration in criminal cases
are also applicable to some civil cases, since the latter often result
in criminal trials.83 Hence, the dissent would order mandatory pro
bono service in both civil and criminal cases, because the two
kinds of cases differ only in degree, but not necessarily in qual-
ity.84 Interestingly, however, even the dissent was silent on the is-
sue of funding.85
76 See id. at 768.
77 See id.
78 See id. at 771.
79 See id. at 757. This brings the law of the jungle and enshrines it into the pantheon
of justice. Id. It is the survival of the fittest, redress to a few, and disregard to the many
who just happen to be indigent. Id.
80 See id.
81 See id. at 773.
82 See id.
83 See id.
84 See id. This is a reasonable approach by the dissent, for justice is well serviced
only when the least among us receives his/her fair portion. Id.
85 See id.
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E. States Constitutional Discussion
Some courts, relying on their state constitutions, have held that
the appointment of counsel when there are no provisions for com-
pensation, is unconstitutional. For instance, the Supreme Courts
of Missouri, Indiana, and New Hampshire, relying on their state
constitutions, have held that lawyers may not be compelled to pro-
vide representation without compensation. 86  These courts rea-
sonably concluded that absent provisions for funding, indigents'
rights would be so eviscerated as to be rendered virtually ineffec-
tual. Other courts, also relying on their state constitutions, have
refused to compel uncompensated appointments because the con-
stitutions provide that persons [lawyers] have a right to compen-
sation for their labor.87 This latter reasoning also pushes the issue
under the ambit of the United States Constitution, where courts,
both state and federal, have had to grapple with this issue.
F. Federal Constitutional Discussion
1. Overview
The provisions of the United States Constitution relevant to the
compulsory pro bono service debate affect lawyers on two levels.
First, in a minority of states, the courts have looked to the United
States Constitution for guidance in evaluating the merits of pro
bono service. The Supreme Courts of Kentucky and Utah have
both held that the burden of uncompensated service is an uncon-
stitutional deprivation of property.88 Moreover, the New York
Court of Appeals has held that if mandatory uncompensated pro
bono services are carried out on a broad scale, it would impose too
great a burden on the bar, and would furthermore, rank as a vio-
lation of the constitutional rights of lawyers. 89
On the second level, it has been held by the Supreme Court that
86 See, e.g., Smith v. State, 394 A.2d 834, 838 (N.H. 1978); Knox County Council v.
State ex rel. McCormick, 29 N.E.2d 405, 412-15 (Ind. 1940); Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 15
(1854).
87 See, e.g., Smith v. State, 394 A.2d 834, 838 (N.H. 1978) (interpreting statute to
mean that attorneys should be paid reasonable fees for court ordered appointments); see
also Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 15 (1854).
88 See Bradshaw v. Ball, 487 S.W.2d 294, 299 (Ky. 1972); Beford v. Salt Lake County,
447 F.2d 193, 194-95 (Ut. 1968).
89 See In re Smiley, 330 N.E.2d 53, 57 (N.Y. 1975) (discussing great burden that
would be placed on attorneys if they were forced to provide service in private litigation).
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the right to practice law is a property right within the meaning of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 90 Fur-
thermore, in Marbury v. Madison,9 1 the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that certain property rights are protected.92 Despite such
precedent, both state93 and federal 94 governments have the right
to take private property for public use, provided just compensation
is paid. This is referred to as the right of eminent domain. 95
Nevertheless, dating back to at least as early as 1922, the Su-
preme Court has made a distinction between "takings" and regula-
tion.96 If the state's action is a regulation pursuant to and consis-
tent with its legitimate police powers, there is no compensatory
taking.97 However, if the regulation goes "too far," a taking oc-
curs. 98 Problems arose since "too far" was left undefined for over
sixty years until the Court addressed physical invasion cases. 99
90 See Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957) (stating that person
cannot be prevented from practicing law except for valid reasons).
91 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
92 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Even though the principal
question addressed in this case was which branch of the government has the final say in
interpreting the Constitution, the Court addressed the issue of property rights. Id.
93 See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 588 at n.2 (2nd ed.
1988). The power to take property by eminent domain is among the powers "reserved to
the states" by the Tenth Amendment. Id.; see also P. NICHOLS, 1 EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.24
(ed. 1974). Despite early doubts about the eminent domain powers of the United States,
since 1875, the right of the United States to exercise that power when reasonably related
to its other powers has been undisputed. Id.; Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 372
(1875) (stating that Fifth Amendment requires that private property shall not be taken
without just compensation).
94 See TRIBE, supra note 93, at 589 & n.3. However, this taking can not be for private
use. Id. See, e.g., Missouri Pacific Rail Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896). The
first Supreme Court decision to hold that a governmental taking of property violates
Fourteenth Amendment due process if it is for a private purpose and that compensation
cannot cure such a taking. Id.
95 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 523 (6th ed. 1990). Eminent domain is defined as:
"The power to take private property for public use by the state, municipalities, and pri-
vate persons or corporations authorized to exercise functions of public character. Id.; see
also U.S. CONST. amend. V. In the United States, the power of eminent domain is
founded in both the federal and state constitutions. The Constitution limits the power to
taking for a public purpose and prohibits the exercise of the power of eminent domain
without just compensation to the owners of the property which is taken. The process of
exercising the power of eminent domain is commonly referred to as "condemnation," or
"expropriation."
96 See Pennsylvania. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (distinguishing
what constitutes taking from other government regulations).
97 See id.
98 See id.
99 See TRIBE, supra note 93, at 599-604.
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2. Taking Analysis in Brief
In 1798, Justice Chase's memorable dictum in Calder v. Bullloo
expressed the undisputed condemnation of any law attempting to
"take property from A and give it to B."'10 1 General principles of
law, enforceable in a proper forum, settled that no form of legisla-
tive authority could be employed to serve private ends; taking,
taxing, and regulation were all inherently linked to the public
good and depended for their legitimacy upon the preservation of
that link. 102 In physical invasion cases, 103 the Supreme Court has
grappled with the issue of "how much" invasion is constitutionally
allowed before a taking occurs.
In PrunYard Shopping Center v. Robins,10 4 students were
barred from soliciting signatures for a petition drive on the prem-
ises of a shopping center. The California Supreme Court con-
cluded that the free speech clause of its state's constitution enti-
tled the students to set up their booth in the shopping center
despite the fact that the shopping center was private. 10 5 The own-
ers of the shopping center argued that by inviting third parties
onto their property to conduct the petition drive, California was
taking their property without just compensation. 106
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, disagreed with
the owners of the shopping center. 107 The Court held that the
right to exclude others from one's property has long been recog-
nized as a fundamental element of one's bundle of property
rights.' 08 Nevertheless, because shopping centers invite people
100 3 U.S. 386 (1798).
101 Id. at 387 (describing unlawful exercises of legislative authority).
102 See TRIBE, supra note 93, at 588 & n. 1-2.
103 See id. at 599-60.
104 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (holding that shopping center could be used as forum for
members of public to hand out pamphlets or seek signatures for petition opposing U.N.
resolution).
105 See TRIBE, supra note 93, at 600 & n.4. As much as it may have wished to, the
California Supreme Court could not rest its decision on the First Amendment to the Fed-
eral Constitution, for the latter had been read as not giving people a right, over and
above the right of the property owner, of free access to shopping centers for expressive
purposes. Id.; see also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 562 (1977)
(allowing matters of public interest to be included in newscasts); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424
U.S. 507, 507 (1976) (prohibiting employees from entering shopping center for purposes
of advertising strike against employer); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 551 (1972)
(enjoining First Amendment protection of distributing handbills).
106 See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 74.
107 See id. at 76 (articulating why prerequisite of free speech did not infringe upon
owner's Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights).
108 See id. at 75 (articulating reasons for individual ownership rights); see also Kai-
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onto their property, this did not fit the traditional property model.
Therefore, the Court refused to view the fact that the appellant's
property had been physically invaded by the petitioners as deter-
minative. 109
In Kaiser Aetna v. United States,110 the Supreme Court held
that a government regulation which invited third parties to tres-
pass on private property to be a compensable taking.11 ' The Kai-
ser Aetna Company secured a long-term lease for a 523-acre pond
and surrounding lands. Kaiser decided to transform the area into
a residential community. 112 After Kaiser had spent millions of
dollars in developing the land, including transforming the pond
into a navigable lake, a dispute developed between Kaiser Aetna
and the United States Corps of Engineers. 113 In essence, the
Corps of Engineers insisted on getting public access to the
pond. 114 The question presented to the Court was whether "the
government effect a compensable taking by saying to the general
public, 'come on in."' Although there was no expropriation, the
government was regulating the property by inviting actual physi-
cal invasion by third parties. 115
Unlike Prune Yard, Kaiser Aetna involved the traditional prop-
erty interests because it pertained to property for which excluding
the public was a critical part of the bundle of rights.116 The Court
ser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (enumerating "right to exclude"
of property provides that government may not take without compensation); Internat'l
News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (noting
that defendant's property right is qualified, not absolute).
109 See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 83-84 (emphasizing that fact that appeal restricted to
common areas conducted activity in orderly fashion).
110 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
111 See id. at 179-80 (holding that government regulation of private property to be
compensable taking).
112 See id. at 167 (describing leased properties of Kaiser Aetna).
113 Id. at 168 (discussing conflict between Kaiser Aetna and U.S. Corps. of Engi-
neers).
114 See id. (discussing Corp. of Engineers argument that Kaiser Aetna was precluded
from denying public access).
115 See id. at 180 (1979). The unconstitutional result would have been the same had
the state sought to ensure public access to the marina by, for example, conditioning issu-
ance to a marina resident of a permit to build a sun deck on the resident's granting to the
general public of a right of access to the marina. Id.; Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483
U.S. 825, 841 (1987). Conditional grant of permission to rebuild house on owner's allow-
ance of public easement is not proper without payment of compensation. Id.
116 See Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176 (noting that limitation imposed on traditional
property interests as "taking"). But c.f. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 84 (acknowledging "right
to exclude" as not essential to use of value of property, and therefore limitations imposed
not equivalent to "taking").
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concluded that, while the consent of the Corps of Engineers in
Kaiser Aetna's development plans could not estop the United
States from now placing the pond under navigational servitude, it
could engender investment-backed expectations rising to the
status of property rights for which the government must pay when
it effectively nationalizes them. 117
In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,118 cable
companies in New York City gave 5% of their gross revenues to
landlords in exchange for the landlords' authorization to make the
necessary CATV installations. 119 In order to give tenants access to
the educational and community benefits of CATV, New York
passed a law requiring all landlords to allow installation of CATV
cables in exchange for a one-time fee of $1.00.120 The landlords,
however, could demand that installation conform to reasonable
conditions necessary to protect the appearance and safety of their
premises, 121 and were also entitled to indemnification by CATV
for any damage resulting from installation, operation or removal
of the CATV facilities. 122
A disgruntled landlord seeking a profit sued Teleprompter for
trespass. The Supreme Court abandoned its ad hoc rule' 23 and
adopted a per se rule. 124 The per se rule, in summary, stated that a
permanent physical occupation authorized by a government is a
compensable taking, however significant the public interest. 125
After Loretto, in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n.,126 the
Supreme Court held that a state's refusal to grant a building per-
mit until the transfer of a strip of the owner's property for perma-
nent easement1 27 amounted to a taking. The easement would only
117 See Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179-180 (discussing conclusion that government
may physically invade property, but must pay compensation).
118 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
119 See id. at 423 (discussing Teleprompter's compensation policy for installation
authorization).
120 See id. at 423-24 (noting State Commission Ruling that landlord is entitled to one
time fee of one dollar).
121 See id. (acknowledging landlord's right to demand quality work for aesthetic rea-
sons).
122 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419-23 & n.3
(1982) (setting forth New York law).
123 See id. at 426 (indicating that inquiry is not "standardless"); see also TRIBE, supra
note 93, at 599 & n. 1. (defining and explaining types of ad hoc rules).
124 See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426 (adopting per se rule).
125 See id. (setting forth elements of per se rule).
126 483 U.S. 825 (1980).
127 See id. at 832 (holding "taking" includes conditional grant of permission to build
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have permitted members of the public to walk along the owner's
sandy strip parallel to the ocean, on their way to and from a public
beach. 128 Even though this easement would not have permitted
individuals to remain on the land, a physical occupation was found
to exist. This amounted to a taking of the owner's property. 129
3. The Positive Law and Natural Law Debate
There has been a continuing debate in the area of constitutional
law between adherence to Natural Law and Positive Law. As it
relates to law, positivism is associated with the idea that law de-
rives its binding quality solely because it proceeds from the state,
which is the dominant political authority in civil society. 130 As
stated by Thomas Hobbes, the nature of man, is a nature in a
state of war, of every man against every other man.131 "Without
organized government, the uncertainty and instability of the hu-
man condition prevent the development of individual personality,
the growth of Art, and culture, and the acquisition of learning and
knowledge." 132 Consequently, all liberties and property must be
surrendered to an absolute sovereign. In exchange, each person
receives order and stability in society. 133 "Human greed and self
interest made total subjection preferable to original liberty, so all
right minded persons must surrender to the sovereign the
on owner's assent to public easement across private property).
128 See id. at 829 (describing easement sought by Commission).
129 See id. at 832 (describing characteristics of "takings").
130 See GEORGE C. CHRISTIE, JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND READINGS ON THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, 292 (1973) (discussing positivism).
131 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN OR THE MATTER, FORmE AND POWER OF A
COMMON WEALTH ECCLESIASTICALL & CIVIL 81-2 (Michael Oakeshott ed., 1946).
So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, com-
petition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory. The first, maketh men invade for gain;
the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation. The first use violence, to make
themselves masters of other men's persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second to
defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any
other sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons, or by reflection in their kin-
dred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name. Hereby it is mani-
fest, that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe,
they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man,
against every man. For war, consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting; but
in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known; as it is
in the nature of weather.
Id.
132 See RICHARD EPSTEIN, "TAKINGS': PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 7 (1985) (discussing human nature and its effect on government).
133 See THOMAS HOBBES, supra note 131.
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state." 134
The positivists, therefore, contend that procedural due process
only serves the role of allowing individuals to get what is "theirs"
as defined by positive rules of law. 135 This argument, carried to its
logical conclusion and seemingly absurd end, justifies any limita-
tion placed on both property rights and individual liberties by the
government, since it is the government which grants such rights
and liberties in the first place. Such absurdity might well have
existed if the Fifth Amendment 136 and Fourteenth Amendment 137
to the Constitution did not exist. What use would the Fifth
Amendment serve if the Federal Government had untrammelled
power to take private property on a whim? Of what consequence
would the Fourteenth Amendment avail if state governments
could not be restrained in taking private property from citizens?
In stark contrast, Natural Law categorically rejects the notion
that "private property and personal liberty are solely creations of
the state."138 On the contrary, Natural Law contends that the
state was developed to protect property and liberty.139 Moreover,
"these conceptions, (personal liberty and private property) are un-
derstood independent of and prior to the formation of the state."140
Therefore, "no rights are justified in a normative way simply be-
cause the state chooses to protect them,"'14 1 instead the state de-
velops certain rules based on what is right and what is wrong. For
example, murder is not wrong because the state prohibits it, in-
stead, the state prohibits murder because murder is wrong.142
Hence independent rules, "rules of acquisition, protection, and
disposition specify how property is acquired and the rights its ac-
134 See EPSTEIN, supra note 132, at 7-8.
135 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance & Due Process, 1982 SUP. Or. REV. 85, 94-
109 (acknowledging term "due process" as affording individuals those procedures that
legislative branch mandates).
136 See U.S. CONST. amend. V, supra note 7 (setting forth relevant part of Fifth
Amendment).
137 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, supra note 8 (setting forth relevant part of Four-
teenth Amendment).
138 See EPSTEIN, supra note 132, at 5. The author asserts that natural rights are less
valuable when not regulated. Political power inhibits opportunism which creates insecu-
rity, which leads to inefficient use of talents and goods. The existence of the state in-
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quisition contains."143 "None of these rests entitlements on the
state, which only enforces the rights and obligations generated by
theories of private entitlement."144
Moreover, John Locke postulates that individual natural rights
to acquire and retain property do not originate with the sovereign,
but are common gifts of mankind.145 For instance, "though the
earth... be common to all men, yet every man has a property in
his own person. This nobody has a right to but himself. The la-
bour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say are prop-
erly his."146 Therefore, according to Locke, the organization of the
state does not require the surrender of all natural rights to the
sovereign. 147 Furthermore, "[i]f the state obtains its authority
from the rights of those whom it represents, it can never claim ex-
emption from the duty to compensate on the ground that it is the
source of all rights. The natural law theory behind the Constitu-
tion precludes that result."148
4. Application of the Taking Analysis
Since the right to practice law is a property right in light of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 149 we need to
address the question of what type of property rights do lawyers
have in their profession. If a lawyer has property rights in his pro-
fession, are these rights similar to those in Prune Yard, 150 Kaiser
143 See EPSTEIN, supra note 132, at 5.
144 Id.
145 See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, ch. 5, 25 (Thomas A.
Peardon ed. 1952) (discussing distinction between rights originated by sovereign and
those which are common gifts of mankind).
146 Id. at 1127.
Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that nature hath provided and left it
in, he hath mixed his labor with, and joined to it something that is his won, and
thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state na-
ture placed it in, it hath by his labor something annexed to it that excludes the
common right of other men. For his labor being the unquestionable property of the
laborer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where
there is enough and as good left in common for others.
Id.
147 See EPSTEIN, supra note 132, at 15. Individuals are not required to give up
rights/possession; rather there exists a network of forced exchanges, where, in the end,
everything is better off. Id.
148 See id. at 42.
149 See Schware v. Board of Bar Exam'rs, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957) (indicating
state cannot exclude person from the practice of law in manner or for reasons which con-
travene Fourteenth Amendment).
150 See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (holding that peti-
tioning in privately owned shopping center, when reasonably exercised, is constitutional).
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Aetna, 151 Loretto, 152 or Nollan?153
It would be difficult, if not impossible, to analogize lawyers'
rights to those of the owners of a shopping center. Lawyers'
rights seem more traditional. That being the case, the protection
they receive should accordingly be more traditional. In some re-
spect, the Kaiser Aetna case1 54 seems similar to that of an attor-
ney compelled to render pro bono service to indigents by a man-
date of a court or any other governmental agency. Like the
owners in Kaiser Aetna, attorneys invest a great deal of time, ef-
fort, and money into becoming lawyers. If government, state or
federal, abridges attorneys' rights to the "fruit of their labors,"
there is no reason why the Supreme Court, upon hearing such a
case, should not reach the same conclusion as in Kaiser Aetna.
This would effectively debunk the positivists' position that since
the state determines property rights, it can take them at will.
This bitter sweet analysis was furthered by some of the Justices in
Arnett v. Kennedy, 155 but was solidly rejected by a majority of the
Court. 156
The per se rule utilized in Loretto157 could also buttress a law-
yer's right to just compensation when he is required to render
service by a governmental edict. Although the cause is certainly
noble and the public's interest is being served, the per se rule could
justify a finding that when lawyers are required by government to
render service without compensation, a taking occurs.
The case with the strongest applicability, however, is Nollan.158
In Nollan, the Court held that the refusal of a state to grant a
building permit except upon the transfer to the public of a perma-
nent easement amounts to a taking of private property for which
151 See Kaiser Aetna v. 44 U.S. 164, 171-74 (1979) (holding private property may not
be taken without just compensation).
152 See Loretto v. Teleprompter CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 431 (1982) (holding actual
physical invasion of property is "taking").
153 See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n., 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1980) (demanding
compensation be paid for conditional grant of permission to build public easement).
154 See Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 164.
155 See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153-55 (1974) (Rhenquist, J., concurring).
Justice Rhenquist stated: "The property interest which [the appellants had] was itself
conditioned by the procedural limitations which had accompanied the grant of interest,
and that where the substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the limitations on
the procedures which are to be employed in determining that right, a litigant ... must
take the bitter with the sweet." Id.
156 Id. at 167.
157 See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426.
158 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 825.
BETWEEN A ROCKAND A HARD PLACE
compensation is constitutionally required. 159 This is applicable to
the argument that lawyers have constructive notice that they will
be required to perform mandatory pro bono work, and that by en-
tering the profession they recognize it as an implied condition to
the license to practice law.160 If the state in Nollan could not com-
pel the property owners to grant the public an easement as a con-
dition to procure a building permit, then the state should not be
able to exact mandatory pro bono work from lawyers as a condi-
tion of their license to practice law. Courts have also considered
the use of a professional's time, experience and skill to be a taking
where such services are compelled because these attributes consti-
tute a professional's stock in trade. 16 1 Nevertheless, courts have
not devised a clear standard to determine whether government ac-
tion affecting private property is a compensatory taking. How-
ever, it has been recognized that when the burdens and benefits of
appropriated services are equitably distributed, there is no com-
pensatory taking because there is an average reciprocity of advan-
tage. 162 Therefore, courts could still find reasons to compel pro
bono service. This, in essence, requires a weighing of burdens and
benefits. Hence, if the indigent's need for a lawyer is as great as
or greater than the lawyer's property right in his profession, then
there is no compensable taking and pro bono service can be com-
pelled by the court. Put another way, these courts are saying that
in certain cases the indigent's need for a lawyer is so burdensome,
that it outweighs the burden mandatory pro bono representation
places on the legal profession. When this occurs, there is no com-
pensable taking.
5. The Ultimate Dilemma Faced by the Court
After all the constitutional discussions, courts are still left with
the dilemma of resolving four basic issues. First, courts must de-
termine whether they have the power to compel representation.
159 See id. (holding that right to exclude others from property is fundamental in
property law)
160 See United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965) (holding that attor-
ney appointed by court to take case does not have Fifth Amendment right to payment).
161 See, e.g., Boyton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 36 F.Supp. 593 (D. Mass. 1941);
Weiner v. Fulton County, 148 S.E.2d 143, 145 (1966); Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 16-7
(1854); McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9, 15 (Iowa 1982); Mount v. Welsh, 247 P.
815, 821 (1926).
162 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (explaining
that if regulation on property goes to far, it will be recognized as taking).
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Second, if they determine that they possess such powers, they
must determine if they have the power to provide compensation
for appointed counsel. Third, if they decide that they have the
power to provide compensation, they must further determine the
source from which such funds must be derived. Finally, if they
can identify the source of the funds, they must decide at what rate
(market rate or below market) these lawyers will be paid.
Thirty-six jurisdictions have decided the issue of mandatory un-
compensated representation. 163 Twenty jurisdictions, including
the federal court system, follow the rule that compensation of ap-
pointed counsel is not required. 164 In addressing this issue, courts
have relied on both inherent and statutory powers. According to
this line of reasoning, courts have the inherent power to take nec-
essary actions to effectuate the administration of justice, 165 and to
regulate the legal profession. 166 Courts have used this concept of
inherent power in a variety of contexts, including providing coun-
sel for indigents. Courts have also relied on statutory power to
compel appointment.167
In addressing the issue of the court's power to provide funding,
eleven of the nineteen states in the majority appear committed to
the existence and validity of an enforceable duty to serve for little
or no compensation when ordered to do so by the court. There are,
however, substantial reservations voiced in eight other states. For
instance, the Georgia court has held that an attorney from whom
services are demanded has a property right in his fees for those
services. New York's highest court also expressed dissatisfaction
with uncompensated appointments. The court held that it had
discretionary power to make such appointments, but refused to do
so in civil actions involving indigents when the legislature has
made no provision for compensation. 168 This, however, offers little
solace to the bar since the majority of cases in which indigents
need counsel are for criminal offences. 169 The majority approach
163 See Shapiro, supra note 8, at 756.
164 See id.
165 See 20 AM JUR. 2D Courts §979 (1965).
166 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 1-102 (1991).
167 See State ex rel. Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757, 759 (Mo. 1985) (stating that
statute does not authorize appointment).
168 See, e.g., In re Smiley, 330 N.E.2d 53, 58 (N.Y. 1975) (stating court has discre-
tionary power to assign counsel without compensation in proper case).
169 See id.
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(twenty jurisdictions), which allows compelled representation
without provisions for compensation, still stands strong today. 170
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Indigents should be guaranteed their Sixth Amendment right to
counsel in both civil and criminal matters, because only equal ac-
cess to the court and the legal system will lead to equal justice.
Nevertheless, lawyers also have rights that society should respect
and protect. Lawyers expend time, effort, energy, and money in
order to become attorneys. It is therefore unfair and unconstitu-
tional1 71 to take lawyers' services without just compensation. To
effectuate the constitutional rights of one group by denying those
of another group is wrong. 172
In most jurisdictions, the question as to whether a judge can
compel a lawyer to serve without compensation has already been
answered in the affirmative. 173 However, because we are effec-
tively choosing between an indigent's right to counsel and a law-
yer's constitutional right to the gains of his labor, we need to de-
termine who has the obligation of guaranteeing, protecting,
enforcing, and paying for the constitutional rights of citizens. 174
It is the government that protects its citizens' constitutional
rights. Consequently, it is the government's function and obliga-
tion to enforce the constitutional rights of its citizens, not the bar
and individual attorneys. As Chief Justice Bird in Yarborough v.
170 See Ex Parte Dibble, 310 S.E.2d 440, 443 (1983) (S.C. Ct. App. 1983) (declining to
join other courts which have refused to appoint lawyers without compensation).
171 See James Adler, et al., Pro bono Legal Services; the Objections and Alternatives
to Mandatory Programs, 53 CAL. ST. B.J. 24 (1978) (arguing that mandatory pro bono
programs are philosophically, practically and possibly constitutionally objectionable).
172 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, 185-205 (1978). For a discus-
sion of competing rights and a government's responsibilities to its citizens. Id.; see also,
John Rawls, The Basic Liberties and Their Priorities, LIBERTY EQUALITY & LAW 9, 12 (
M. Mc Murrin, ed. 1987) 'The priority of liberty implies in practice that a basic liberty
[cannot be limited even] for reasons of public good or perfectionist values. This restriction
holds even when those who benefit from the greater efficiency, or together share the sum
of the advantage, are the same persons whose liberties are limited or denied." Moreover:
" Among the basic liberties of a person is the right to hold and to have the exclusive use
of personal property." Id. at 12.
173 See Comment, The Uncompensated Counsel System, supra note 2, at 710 (stating
that counsel for poor in Kentucky always have served by court appointment and without
pay).
174 See Adler et al., supra note 171 (providing catalog of worthwhile suggestions pur-
suant to solving this problem).
1999]
518 ST. JOHNS JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 13:491
Superior Court175 stated in dissent, "[T]he financial burden en-
gendered by ensuring the constitutionally guaranteed right to
counsel squarely rests on the state."176 Moreover, the government
is strategically positioned to spread the burden over the society as
a whole, by taxation, for instance, instead of burdening one seg-
ment of society unduly. 177
Taxation serves many functions. First, it is used to raise money
for the operation of government at every level. Second, it is used
to allocate the cost of public goods and services among Americans
based on their income. Third, it is also used as a tool of social
policy.178 Admittedly, the word or even the very thought of "taxa-
tion" has never been popular with the masses. 179 Many elections
have been either won or lost because of the issue of taxation. 180
Nevertheless, elected officials need to cultivate the political will to
make decisions that are in society's best interest. Taxation is not
the cure to all of society's ills, but at times it is not only necessary,
it is desirable. Public officials should stop watching the polls, and
start legislating and governing based on what is best, not what is
popular.
Besides a direct tax on society at large, a number of other crea-
tive and innovative steps could be taken to preserve indigents'
right to effective assistance of counsel. Indigents' legal counsel
should be funded by the government just as the United States' At-
torneys and District Attorneys are publicly funded. Imagine the
outrage that would ensue, if the responsibility of prosecuting
criminals was thrust upon the private bar. Placing the responsi-
bility of representing indigents on the private bar should similarly
175 See 216 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1984) (Bird C. J. dissenting).
176 Id.
177 See Adler et al., supra note 171, at 25 ('That burden, like the costs of Social Secu-
rity, Welfare, and similar mechanisms of meeting society's basic financial needs, should
be borne equitably by all citizens.").
178 See BURKE & FRIED, TAXATION OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME, 3 (1981).
179 See GORDON S. WOOD, RADICALISM OF AMERICAN REVOLUTION 244 (1992) (stating
people in original thirteen colonies rebelled against Stamp Act); THOMAS PAINE, COMMON
SENSE 14-24, (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1976) (stating that series of tax levies (Sugar Act,
Stamp Act, Townsend Act; etc.) led to uproar resulting in American Revolution);
KENNETH C. DAVIS, DON'T KNOW MUCH ABOUT HISTORY, 44-48 (1990) (stating that prob-
lem was really taxation; issue of representation was raised only as smoke screen).
180 See, e.g., George Bush, Read My Lips, No New Taxes Convention. In his accep-
tance speech at the Republican National Convention, George Bush exclaimed "Read my
lips - no new taxes" and came from behind to soundly beat his opponent Michael Du-
kakis. Although this was not a one-issue campaign, it was this sound-byte which turned
the tide for George Bush.
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engender great outrage. Furthermore, there are valid public pol-
icy reasons for publicly funding legal services to indigents. 18 1
First, it is in the interest of society that each defendant receive a
fair trial. If a defendant, indigent or otherwise, does not receive a
fair trial and he is convicted, the system loses it legitimacy. 182
This is not only because an innocent person is convicted, but also
because a guilty person is still at large, making a mockery of the
system. 18 3
Further, even if the accused committed the act, the system
similarly suffers if ineffective assistance of counsel denies him the
opportunity to proffer defenses and/or justifications. This may give
the impression that justice is for sale and only those with money
can mount an effective defense and receive justice. 184 This under-
mines the system, erodes its legitimacy, and renders it suspect.
Hence, to preserve the legitimacy of the system, or maybe even to
restore it, some changes warranted. Wherever a United States
Attorney is appointed, and/or a District Attorney is elected, there
should be a corresponding Public Defender in that jurisdiction. 185
This should be a joint effort between the Federal Government and
State Governments. The staff in each Public Defender's office
181 See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 66 (1991).
"The final cause of law is the welfare of society. The rule that misses its aim cannot per-
manently justify its existence." Id. Cardozo was speaking here about justice. The first
sentence could therefore be rephrased as this: "The final cause of [justice] is the welfare
of society."
182 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAWS EMPIRE 1-2 (1986). "If this judgment is unfair, then
the community has inflicted a moral injury on one of its members because it has stamped
him in some degree or dimension an outlaw. The injury is gravest when an innocent per-
son is convicted of a crime .... or a defendant leaves with an undeserved stigma." Id.
183 See CARDOZO, supra note 181, at 67. "[W]hen they are called upon to say how far
existing rules are to be extended or restricted, they must let the welfare of society fix the
path, its direction and its distance." Id. Prosecutors, judges, politicians and society as a
whole need to understand that a conviction is no indicia of justice. Justice demands effec-
tive assistance of counsel. Effective assistance of counsel demands funding, and govern-
ment (state/federal) has the authority and the obligation to fund programs to effectuate
effective assistance of counsel to indigents.
184 The O.J. Simpson criminal case illustrated this point. Whether one believes he
committed the crime, both sides can agree that but for his financial resources, he could
not have waged such a successful defense. If this is true, shouldn't we shudder at the
thought of the plight of indigent dependents caught up in our criminal justice system?
185 See JOHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 60 (1972). "[Elach person is to have an
equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for oth-
ers." Id. Rawls refers to this as his first principle. "The basic liberties of citizens are,
roughly speaking, political iberty.... Together with freedom of speech and assembly;
and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of
law. These liberties are all required to be equal by the first principle, since citizens of a
just society are to have the same basic rights." Id.; see also THE GREAT POLITICAL
THEORIES 463 (Michael Curtis, ed. Avon Books 1981).
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should be paid at the same rate as the staff at the United States
Attorney's Office and/or the District Attorney's Office. Moreover,
the public defenders office should be so well financed that it can
afford all the legal accoutrements enjoyed by the District Attorney
and the United States Attorney. For instance, legal on-line serv-
ices, computer assisted legal research, an up to date library, and
the resources to retain reputable expert witnesses. Only then will
indigents truly receive effective assistance of counsel. 186
In the alternative, attorneys serving indigent clients could be
paid on the scale provided in the Federal Attorneys Fees Act (the
Act).187 The Act provides a scale based on the attorney's experi-
ence and skill. This would not be as radical as the recommenda-
tion immediately above, but it could be just as effective in deliv-
ering effective assistance of counsel to indigents.
Law schools could also be given grants to operate large scale le-
gal clinics that cater to indigent clients. In the alternative, such a
program could be broadened to include all institutions of higher
education. The college or university legal clinics could be estab-
lished and funded by "Block Grants," provided by state and federal
governments.
Tax incentives could also be used at both the Federal and state
level to make more quality legal services accessible to indigents.
For example, large law firms which are often insulated from man-
datory pro bono service could be induced to devote a certain per-
centage of their practice to pro bono work and receive a corre-
sponding tax deduction for that percentage of their firm's
profits. 188
Firms could also be induced to employ at least one extra associ-
ate per year with a commitment that these associates work for le-
gal services organizations. For example, one such associate could
work for the Legal Aid Society, while his firm pays his salary. The
186 See RAWLS, supra note 185. "[S]ocial and economic inequalities are to be so ar-
ranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and
(b) attached to positions and offices open too all" Id.; see also CURTIS, supra note 185.
'The second principal applies, in the first approximation, to the distribution of income
and wealth and to the design of organizations that make use of differences in authority
and responsibility, or chains of command. While the distribution of wealth and income
need not be equal, it must be to everyone's advantage.... One applies the second princi-
ple by... arrang[ing] social and economic inequalities so that everyone benefits." Id.
187 See 42 U.S.C. 1988 (1994).
188 Admittedly, some firms have already established pro bono departments, but this
practice is not embraced by a majority of firms. This needs to be adopted on a wider scale
in order to be more effective.
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firms, on the other hand, could receive a tax deduction for the
salaries (whether in whole or in part) of these extra associates, as
well as costs for operating the pro bono program. 189 Other firms
could make contributions in other ways. They could make mone-
tary contributions to legal services organizations and receive a tax
deduction for such contributions. Legal services organizations
would therefore be able to employ more attorneys, and update
their technology which would maximize efficiency and enhance
productivity, thereby ameliorating the problem. 190
Tax relief could also be granted to the solo and small firm prac-
titioners who are desirous of, or are already engaged in offering
legal services to indigents. For instance, those whose entire prac-
tice is devoted to the poor, could be offered a yearly abatement of a
percentage of their otherwise burdensome student loan obliga-
tions. In the alternative, they could also be given a tax deduction
for their student loan payments, as an inducement to serve the
poor, as well as a reward for so noble a service. A tax deduction
could also be granted for student loan interest payments for those
who render legal service to the poor on a less than full-time basis.
Legal empowerment zones could also be established in poor
neighborhoods. These would operate similarly to enterprise zones
which have brought economic relief to many blighted areas. Law-
yers who set up offices in these empowerment zones and devote
their practice to the poor, could be given tax incentives, be quali-
fied for low-interest loans, receive forgiveness of their student
loans, and could be taxed at a lower rate for a specific period of
time.
States could designate certain organizations as "legal
empowerment organizations," and offer incentives for lawyers to
work for such organizations for a specific period of time. Organi-
zations such as Legal Aid, Legal Services, Public Defender, and
Neighborhood Legal Services could be designated "legal
empowerment organizations." For example, attorneys working for
189 This would certainly lighten the burden of legal services organizations and lessen
the affliction of indigents.
190 The Legal Aid Society, for instance, is for the most part privately funded. When
one contemplates the tremendous service being rendered by the Legal Aid Society, one
could only imagine how much indigents' lot could be improved if there were more organi-
zations of this nature active on a nation wide basis. For example, the Legal Services Cor-
poration's "hands are tied behind its back" because it is forbidden by law to represent in-
digents' in criminal cases, even though indigent criminal defendants comprise the largest
group in need of legal representation.
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these organizations for a five year period could receive student
loan forgiveness as well as other incentives.
Each state, as well as the federal government, could offer a cer-
tain number of scholarships or annual tuition reductions to law
students who have an interest in serving the poor. These scholar-
ships or reduced tuition would follow each student through to the
completion of his studies. Upon completing his studies and pass-
ing the bar, each student would have to render legal service to the
poor for an allotted period of time. The cumulative effect of all
these suggestions would have an enabling effect in the delivering
of legal services to indigents. For example, more money would be
available to employ more attorneys in the organizations which
serve the legal needs of indigents.
Some may argue that incentives are inappropriate, since salary
is already paid to lawyers, even those rendering legal services to
the poor. The sad commentary is that those who render legal
service to the poor receive compensation way below the market
rate, yet such lawyers, especially the sole practitioner, must oper-
ate in the same market as those who are well paid. Sadder yet,
those of us who have served indigents have had to do so at a great
financial sacrifice and at times even to the detriment of our credit
rating.
The federal courts were correct in concluding that the right to
practice law is a property right within the meaning of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 191 This forbids the
government from requiring a small number of persons (lawyers)
from bearing the cost that ought to be assumed by the public at
large. 192 But instead of resorting to the non sequitur "reciprocity of
advantage"193 analysis, the court should have insisted that attor-
neys whose property is taken should be compensated. The courts
should have recognized that in order for indigents to receive effec-
tive assistance of counsel, funding is critical. Otherwise, the
courts are only rendering lip service to an idea, but offering little
help to those in need of legal services, but locked in the vise of in-
digence.
191 See Schware v. Bd. Bar Examn'rs, 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1975) (holding that New
Mexico deprived plaintiff of Due Process in denying him opportunity to qualify for protec-
tion of law).
192 See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
193 See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (discussing theory of "reci-
procity of advantage" in property rights case); DWORKIN, supra note 172, at 185-205.
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The Court gets even deeper in the constitutional maze; "[a]s
long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limita-
tion and must yield to the police power."194 This is as dangerous
as it is frightening. What rights are subject to limitations? If
property rights are included, when will free speech, freedom of re-
ligion, and other rights be effected? Moreover, what are these im-
plied limitations, and who determines these limitations.
In an effort to redeem itself, the Court has stated, "When it [the
taking] reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not all cases, there
must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sus-
tain the act."195 Surprisingly, the Court went even further by as-
serting that "[w]e are in danger of forgetting that a strong public
desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way
of paying for the change." 196
This is the crux of the matter. The Court should have sent a
clear message that when government takes property, it must offer
just compensation. 197 Just compensation means full and perfect
equivalent in money of the... property taken. 198 In other words,
market value, "what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing
seller." 199
Since the judiciary is the safeguard of our liberty and property
under the Constitution,200 it must not safeguard one person's or
group's liberty or property at the expense of those of another
person or group. 20 1 As one great jurist stated, "[j]ustice is the
tolerable accommodation of the conflicting interests of soci-
ety ...... "202 The rights of lawyers and those of indigent people
are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Though conflicting at




197 See U.S. CONST. amend V.
198 See Monongahela Nay. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1863) (interpret-
ing Fifth Amendment right to compensation in dam condemnation proceeding).
199 See United States. v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943).
200 See Chief Justice Evans Hughes, Elmira, N.Y. (1906), quoted in WESLEY D. CAMP,
CAMP'S UNFAMILIAR QUOTATIONS: FROM 200 B.C. TO THE PRESENT 163 (1990).
201 See DWORIUN, supra note 172, at 185-205.
202 See Judge Learned Hand, quoted in WESLEY D. CAMP, CAMP'S UNFAMILIAR
QUOTATIONS: FROM 200 B.C. TO THE PRESENT 164 (1990).
203 See JOHN RAWLs, POLITIcAL LIBERALISM 15-22 (1993). Rawls suggests instead
that we adopt a system of cooperation, which operates to the benefit of society as a whole.
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This can be accomplished if courts choose to grapple with the
real issues instead of looking for safe harbors, easy answers, and
resorting to politically safe decisions. 204
V. CONCLUSION
Lest I be misconstrued, I believe that all lawyers should per-
form pro bono service. But I insist, that all lawyers, including
tenured law professors, 205 judges in the security of life-time or
periodic tenure, 206 and "big time" lawyers with their six-figure
salaries, should be included.20 7 This is important for far too of-
ten, the burden falls on the little guy who is fighting to stay
afloat. This obligation of lawyers, however, is not a legal one, it
A system which does not sacrifice the rights of any individual or group in order to grant
an advantage to another individual or group. Only when we reach this point do we really
achieve justice. Id.
204 See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 9-32 (1985) (discussing judges
making political decisions).
205 Many law professors and commentators who write glowing articles on the merits
of mandatory pro bono service for lawyers are safe in their positions with their guaran-
teed salaries. By and large they write not so much as thinkers providing practical solu-
tions, but more like armchair philosophers whose writings are rife with pedantry, not to
the constitution, but to some ill-defined and ill-developed historical and professional obli-
gation. See, e.g. Rosenfeld, supra, note 4, at 286-96. Rosenfeld is convinced that the prac-
tice is constitutional because the majority of jurisdictions enforce mandatory pro bono
representation without pay and have always done so. Id. He further asserts that this is
an obligation which attorneys already owes to the public. Moreover, since the govern-
ment does not pay for the performance of public duty already owed, (jury service, for in-
stance), attorneys cannot demand payment for mandatory pro bono service. Id. There are
several problems with Rosenfeld's position. First, it elevates preponderance to the level of
constitutionality. According to this line of reasoning, since mandatory pro bono service is
required in the majority of jurisdictions in the United States, with the blessings of the
majority of the courts, that makes the practice constitutional. Carried to its logical end,
this concept would obviate the need for a constitution. If all matters can be settled simply
by being accepted by the majority, I assert, there is no need for a constitution. Second, he
elevates historicity to the level of constitutionality. Therefore, because practice has its
roots in history that in and of itself grants it constitutional moorings. In terms of this
obligation already owed by lawyers, Rosenfeld has yet to show how this duty developed
and how it became obligatory. Simply put, Rosenfeld is simply echoing the mantra of tra-
dition. The greatest difficulty with Rosenfeld's position however, is his assertion that
lawyers can be required to perform this obligation without pay because the government
does not pay for the performance of public duties, such as jury duty. But can jury duty
really be analogized to a lawyer's professional service?; see also Oliver Wendell Holmes,
10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). Holmes found it "revolting to have no better reason for
a rule of law than so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV." Id.
206 Admittedly, only Federal judges have lifetime tenure with good behavior, pursu-
ant to Article III Section 1 of the Constitution. Nevertheless, even state judges who are
elected or appointed for a stated term do enjoy a guaranteed salary for that period. Many
lawyers called upon to represent indigents are themselves threatened by indigence.
207 Some of these lawyers are already involved in pro bono service. The case I am
making here is for a greater effort from a wider segment of society, including those at the
top: ;judges, professors, and big-time lawyers.
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is only a moral obligation.208 We, like all other professional
groups, have a moral obligation to help the poor. Nevertheless,
we must not lose sight of the seminal issue. It is the govern-
ment's responsibility to safeguard and guarantee its citizens'
constitutional rights; hence, it is the government's responsibility
to bear the costs consequent to such guarantees, not any one par-
ticular group of citizens. 20 9
No other professional group has been burdened with so great
an obligation as lawyers. For instance, although there is a con-
stitutional protection of freedom of speech, 2 10 the media is not
compelled to give free air time or newspaper space to every indi-
gent who wants to make a point. Furthermore, there was not
even enough support in Congress to pass a bill requiring media
owners to grant free air time for something such as election
campaigns.2 11 Similarly, although the Constitution guarantees
freedom to travel,2 12 the government does not mandate that the
travel industry offer free travel to every indigent person who
wants to get from point A to point B. Moreover, although there
are fundamental rights to marriage and procreation, 2 13 the gov-
208 We need to remember however, that moral obligations cannot be legislated, for
they are generated by ethics rather than law. See Adler et al., supra note 171, at 25,
quoting PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 292 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds.
1970).
As to the rules of beneficence, these, as far as concerns matters of detail, must nec-
essarily be abandoned in great measure to the jurisdiction of private ethics. In many
cases the beneficial quality of the act depends essentially upon the disposition of the
agent; that is, upon the motives by which he appears to have been prompted to per-
form it; upon their belonging to the head of sympathy, love of amity, or love of repu-
tation; and not to any head of self-regarding motives, brought into play by the force
of political constraint: in a word, upon their being such as denominate his conduct
free and voluntary, according to one of the many senses given to those ambiguous
expressions.
Id.
209 See generally Adler, et al., supra note 171 (arguing that this burden, like Social
Security, welfare, and similar mechanisms of meeting society's basic financial needs,
should be borne equitably by all citizens).
210 See U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
211 Senator Arlen Specter, Republican of Pennsylvania, said he could not support the
original McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform bill be cause "the free airtime provi-
sion constituted a taking of private property by government, without just compensation."
This Week (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 21, 1997).
212 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also N.Y. v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 1 (1959) (dis-
cussing legality of forcing an out of state witness to testify to forum state); Aptheker v.
Sec. of State, 378 U.S. 500, 517 (1964) (indicating freedom of travel is a constitutional
liberty similar to rights of free speech and association); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 638 (1969) (discussing fundamental right of interstate movement).
213 See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (discussing
right of procreation).
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ernment does not compel members of the clergy to officiate at
weddings without compensation, nor are physicians compelled to
render free procreational and prenatal service to indigents.
Therefore, lawyers should not be compelled to render free legal
service. 2 14
214 See Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 2, 120-121 (1866). "The Constitution of the
United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with
the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times and under all circumstances."
Id. This, I assume, would include lawyers.
